Per Rønne <per@RQNNE.invalid> wrote:
> Jesper <spambuster@users.toughguy.net> wrote:
>
> > Per Rønne <per@RQNNE.invalid> wrote:
> >
> > > Jesper <spambuster@users.toughguy.net> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Det skete naturligvis også i det tilfælde! Intet kan vedtages i
> > > > sikkerhedsrådet med mindre det vedtages i en engelsk og en fransk
> > > > version samtidigt
> > >
> > > Det skete altså i dette tilfælde.
> >
> > Jamen i så tilfælde er resolutionen ikke trådt i kraft før den franske
> > version blev vedtaget og det med gyldighed for begge versioner, hvor
> > ingen fortolkning der ikke fuldtud kan rummes indenfor begge versioner,
> > sådan er reglerne.
>
> Kun den engelske version blev altså 'vedtaget', og arabiske forsøg på at
> få ændret 'occupied territories' til '/the/ occupied territories' blev
> afvist.
>
> <
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution_242#French_version_vs._English_
> version_of_text>
>
> hvorfra jeg citerer:
>
> =
> The Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America argues
> the practice at the UN is that the binding version of any resolution is
> the one voted upon. In the case of 242 that version was in English, so
> they assert the English version the only binding one. Georgetown
> University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy points out that this
> was indeed the position held by the United States and United Kingdom:
>
> ... both the British and the Americans pointed out that 242 was a
> British resolution; therefore, the English language text was
> authoritative and would prevail in any dispute over interpretation.
>
> ...
>
> Opponents of the "all territories" reading remind that the UN Security
> Council declined to adopt a draft resolution including the definite
> article way prior to the adoption of Resolution 242. They argue that, in
> interpreting a resolution of an international organization, one must
> look to the process of the negotiation and adoption of the text. This
> would make the text in English, the language of the discussion, take
> precedence.
>
> Legal interpretation
>
> Expressio unius est exclusio alterius
>
> The legal principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius (which states
> that the terms excluded from a law must be considered as excluded
> intentionally) is cited by some[citation needed] as operating against an
> "all territories" reading. Arab states specifically requested that the
> resolution be changed to read "all territories" instead of
> "territories." Their request was discussed by the UN Security council.
> However, it was rejected. The Security Council actively chose to reject
> writing "all territories" and instead wrote "territories." And it was
> this version, without "all" that was passed. Others insist that the
> legal principle in question cannot operate so as to create ambiguity.
> Per Lord Caradon, the chief author of the resolution:
>
> It was from occupied territories that the resolution called for
> withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a
> test not possibly subject to any doubt as a matter of fact...East
> Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan and Sinai were occupied in the
> 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the
> Resolution insisted.
>
> Lord Caradon also maintains,
>
> We didn't say there should be a withdrawal to the '67 line; we did
> not put the 'the' in, we did not say all the territories, deliberately..
> We all knew - that the boundaries of '67 were not drawn as permanent
> frontiers, they were a cease-fire line of a couple of decades earlier...
> We did not say that the '67 boundaries must be forever.
>
> The drafting process
>
> A key part of the case in favour of a "some territories" reading is the
> claim that British and American officials involved in the drafting of
> the Resolution omitted the definite article deliberately in order to
> make it less demanding on the Israelis. As George Brown, British Foreign
> Secretary in 1967, commented:
>
> I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve
> the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the
> Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and
> complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council. I
> formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to
> the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said 'Israel
> will withdraw from territories that were occupied', and not from 'the'
> territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the
> territories.
>
> Lord Caradon, chief author of the resolution, takes a subtly different
> slant. His focus seems to be that the lack of a definite article is
> intended to deny permanence to the "unsatisfactory" pre-1967 border,
> rather than to allow Israel to retain land taken by force. Such a view
> would appear to allow for the possibility that the borders could be
> varied through negotiation:
>
> Knowing as I did the unsatisfactory nature of the 1967 line, I
> wasn't prepared to use wording in the Resolution that would have made
> that line permanent. Nonetheless, it is necessary to say again that the
> overwhelming principle was the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of
> territory by war' and that meant that there could be no justification
> for the annexation of territory on the Arab side of the 1967 line merely
> because it had been conquered in the 1967 war. The sensible way to
> decide permanent 'secure and recognized' boundaries would be to set up a
> Boundary Commission and hear both sides and then to make impartial
> recommendations for a new frontier line, bearing in mind, of course, the
> "inadmissibility" principle. The purposes are perfectly clear, the
> principle is stated in the preamble, the necessity for withdrawal is
> stated in the operative section. And then the essential phrase which is
> not sufficiently recognized is that withdrawal should take place to
> secure and recognized boundaries, and these words were very carefully
> chosen: they have to be secure and they have to be recognized. They will
> not be secure unless they are recognized. And that is why one has to
> work for agreement. This is essential. I would defend absolutely what we
> did. It was not for us to lay down exactly where the border should be. I
> know the 1967 border very well. It is not a satisfactory border, it is
> where troops had to stop in 1947, just where they happened to be that
> night, that is not a permanent boundary...
>
>
> Eugene V Rostow, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in
> 1967 and one of the drafters of the resolution, draws attention to the
> fact that the text proposed by the British had succeeded ahead of
> alternatives (in particular, a more explicit text proposed by the Soviet
> Union):
>
> ... paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of
> Israeli armed forces 'from territories occupied in the recent conflict',
> and not 'from the territories occupied in the recent conflict'. Repeated
> attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word 'the' failed in
> the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to assert
> that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories
> now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the Armistice
> Demarcation lines.
>
> The USSR and the Arabs supported a draft demanding a withdrawal to
> the 1967 Lines. The US, Canada and most of West Europe and Latin America
> supported the draft which was eventually approved by the UN Security
> Council.
>
> Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338... rest on two principles,
> Israel may administer the territory until its Arab neighbors make peace;
> and when peace is made, Israel should withdraw to 'secure and recognized
> borders', which need not be the same as the Armistice Demarcation Lines
> of 1949.
>
> He also points out that attempts to explicitly widen the motion to
> include "the" or "all" territories were explicitly rejected
>
> Motions to require the withdrawal of Israel from 'the' territories
> or 'all the territories' occupied in the course of the Six Day War were
> put forward many times with great linguistic ingenuity. They were all
> defeated both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council.
>
> Rostow's President, Lyndon B Johnson, appears to support this last view:
>
> We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines
> between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear,
> however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967 will not bring
> peace.
>
> Arthur Goldberg, another of the resolution's drafters, concurred that
> Resolution 242 does not dictate the extent of the withdrawal, and added
> that this matter should be negotiated between the parties:
>
> Does Resolution 242 as unanimously adopted by the UN Security
> Council require the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all of the
> territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war? The answer is no. In
> the resolution, the words the and all are omitted. Resolution 242 calls
> for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in
> the 1967 conflict, without specifying the extent of the withdrawal. The
> resolution, therefore, neither commands nor prohibits total withdrawal.
>
> If the resolution is ambiguous, and purposely so, on this crucial
> issue, how is the withdrawal issue to be settled? By direct negotiations
> between the concerned parties. Resolution 242 calls for agreement
> between them to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement. Agreement
> and acceptance necessarily require negotiations.
>
> Mr. Michael Stewart, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
> Affairs, in a reply to a question in Parliament, 9 December 1969: "As I
> have explained before, there is reference, in the vital United Nations
> Security Council Resolution, both to withdrawal from territories and to
> secure and recognized boundaries. As I have told the House previously,
> we believe that these two things should be read concurrently and that
> the omission of the word 'all' before the word 'territories' is
> deliberate."
>
> President Lyndon Johnson:
>
> "The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce
> lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and
> other arrangements that will give them security against terror,
> destruction, and war.
>
> "There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an
> immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. As our
> distinguished and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already
> said, this is not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities."
>
> President Ronald Reagan:
>
> "Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and
> defensible borders, and it has a right to demand of its neighbours that
> they recognize those facts.
>
> "I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for
> survival, ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago.
> In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest
> point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of
> hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way
> again."
>
> Secretary of State Albright to the U.N. General Assembly:
>
> "We simply do not support the description of the territories occupied by
> Israel in 1967 as 'Occupied Palestinian Territory'. In the view of my
> government, this language could be taken to indicate sovereignty."
>
> Mr. Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 July 1970(NBC "Meet
> the Press"): "That Resolution did not say 'withdrawal to the pre-June 5
> lines'. The Resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve
> agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other
> words, the question of the final borders is a matter of negotiations
> between the parties."
>
> Secretary of State Christopher's letter to Netanyahu:
>
> "I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is entitled to
> secure and defensible borders, which should be directly negotiated and
> agreed with its neighbors."
>
> Secretary of State George Shultz:
>
> "Israel will never negotiate from, or return to, the lines of partition
> or to the 1967 borders.
>
> "So the state of Israel cannot agree to anything other than its own
> secure, defensible, and internationally recognized borders."
> =
The representative for India stated to the Security Council:
It is our understanding that the draft resolution, if approved by
the Council, will commit it to the application of the principle of total
withdrawal of Israel forces from all the territories - I repeat, all the
territories - occupied by Israel as a result of the conflict which began
on 5 June 1967.
The representatives from Nigeria, France, USSR, Bulgaria, United Arab
Republic (Egypt), Ethiopia, Jordan, Argentina and Mali supported this
view, as worded by the representative from Mali: "[Mali] wishes its vote
today to be interpreted in the light of the clear and unequivocal
interpretation which the representative of India gave of the provisions
of the United Kingdom text".
Israel was the only country represented at the Security Council to
express a contrary view. The USA, United Kingdom, Denmark, China and
Japan were silent on the matter, but the US and UK did point out that
other country's comments on the meaning of 242 were simply their own
views. The Syrian representative was strongly critical of the text's
"vague call on Israel to withdraw".
The statement by the Brazilian representative perhaps gives a flavour of
the complexities at the heart of the discussions:
I should like to restate...the general principle that no stable
international order can be based on the threat or use of force, and that
the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means
should not be recognized...Its acceptance does not imply that
borderlines cannot be rectified as a result of an agreement freely
concluded among the interested States. We keep constantly in mind that a
just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on
secure permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the
neighboring States.
--
Jesper