"Haavard" <anti@anti.anti.anti.anti> wrote in message
> Er du komplett idiot? Den eneste grunnen til at Israel bomber i
> Libanon er at de ble angrepet, og fortsatt blir det, av Hizbollah.
???
Teite folk går det 20 på dusinet av.
Kjell
--------------------------------
*Where's it all heading?*
Without a crushing victory over Hizbullah, Israel's long-term viability will
be at risk
Ron Ben-Yishai
After two-and-a-half weeks of fighting in the north, we don't know exactly
what the government and the army are looking to achieve. We, too, don't know
how they plan to achieve the goals they have set - if in fact any have been
set.
We citizens need to know such things, not only because we are the ones who
will pay the price, but also because that's the way democratic countries
function. And especially because when goals are clear, it makes difficulties
along the way bearable. Clear goals also moderate fluctuations in public
opinion, as a result of reports coming from the front.
Both IDF and the political echelon are terribly naive: There is much more at
stake in Lebanon than pushing Hizbullah north and dismantling and disarming
the organization. This is a defining stage in the current battle in the
Middle East, between radical, militant Islam and pragmatic forces, including
Israel.
Who wins?
If Hizbullah comes out of this fight with the upper hand, Hamas, the Moslem
Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan and other jihadis in the region will look to
Iran for leadership and will adopt Hizbullah's tactics. Normal life in
Israel will not be possible, and in the long term Israel's existence will be
at risk.
A draw will allow Hizbullah to regroup and return to battle after a short
period. In practice, such an outcome would be a loss for Israel.
On the other hand, if Israel wins, the threat from the north will be
emasculated for a long time. Palestinian extremists will be weakened and
will seek agreement with Israel. Even Iran and Syria will be forced to
re-evaluate the situation. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to win this
battle.
What is victory?
But what, exactly, constitutes victory? On a strategic level, there is no
argument between the political echelon and the IDF: First of all, the
removal of armed Hizbullah forces from south Lebanon and a complete halt to
Katyusha fire at Israel.
Second, Security Council Resolution 1559, which demands the disarming of all
militias in Lebanon and requires the Lebanese army to deploy in the south of
the country and to wrest control of the area from Hizbullah (either alone or
aided by an international force).
Thus, Hizbullah will not be allowed to possess rockets anywhere in Lebanon.
Implementing this resolution is the heart of the arrangement Israel seeks
backing from the international community, is particularly crucial now.
In the name of security, Jerusalem demands the right to fire at armed
infiltrators (who are not members of the Lebanese army or the international
force), into the two-kilometer wide security zone north of the border.
The third point is the return of Israel's kidnapped soldiers in exchange for
a "reasonable price": The freeing of Lebanese prisoners, Hizbullah fighters
and bodies to the Lebanese government, as is customary at the end of all
wars. These are the ingredients to affect the "change in situation" that
Olmert and Peretz talk about.
Don't let up
The IDF must not let up before the details of a diplomatic arrangement are
clear and acceptable to all sides, including Hizbullah and its patrons.
Another goal must be to prevent an extraneous armed clash with Syria. Such a
diplomatic arrangement would represent a victory for Israel.
But such an achievement will be attainable only if an answer is found for
two fundamental problems. Let's say the Lebanese army and a multi-national
force deploy in the south. Will they prevent Hizbullah and Palestinian
terrorists from infiltrating the area in order to stage attacks near the
Israeli border?
Worse: Who would dare try to take Hizbullah's rockets away after this latest
round of fighting? Is there anyone to try and prevent Iran and Syria from
re-arming the group with long-range weapons? After all, the Lebanese army is
weak, and most of its soldiers are Shiite.
There is also no chance an international force - either NATO or the UN -
will fight Hizbullah and take the chance of heavy losses. The government's
and the IDF's answer to these questions is that Israeli military pressure,
international diplomatic pressure and pressure from Lebanese civilians on
Hizbullah will together bring the organization to a position where they (and
their sponsors) will be forced to accept a diplomatic agreement that will
turn the group from a military force into a political-social one.
But for this to happen, it must be preceded by a crushing military victory.
Military carrot and stick
"We can't make Nasrallah wave a white flag," says the IDF general staff. But
Hizbullah can be weakened militarily, their leaders can be targeted, and we
can nibble away at the group's logistical ability to the breaking point.
The IDF's goal is to create a situation in which Hizbullah officers reach
the conclusion that they can no longer cause heavy casualties to Israeli
forces, and that their ability to cause break the Israeli home front by
firing rockets and missiles is withering.
The second operational goal for the army is to cause Hizbullah to lose
legitimacy amongst the civilian population of Lebanon, including amongst
Shiites.
How can these goals be realized?
The IDF currently believes that only a series of ground operations, together
with a massive show of air and ground fire, can break Hizbullah's military
and rocket ability.
Back to the mud
At this stage no one is talking about occupying south Lebanon, but rather
neutralizing several centers of opposition and main launching points south
of the Litany River, both via siege and pummeling them with firepower.
The cabinet has approved such an operation. But if it doesn't help, they
will need to send in large ground forces to take control of a large portion
of south Lebanon, and to hold them until a diplomatic agreement can be
reached.
In order to prepare for such an eventuality, the cabinet has approved the
call-up for three reserve divisions. The call-up was meant to advance the
possibility that a large-scale action would bring Syria into the fight,
creating a two-front war in the north.
The IDF wants to increase civilian pressure on Hizbullah by continuing to
strike infrastructure targets in Lebanon, especially the ones that serve the
Shiite population. The cabinet refused to approve this yesterday.
Senior IDF officers propose a diplomatic "carrot": That the Israeli
government will announce clearly that it accepts in principle the
arrangement offered by Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Seniora, including the
demand that Israel transfer control of the Sheba Farms region to Lebanese
control. Thus, Seniora will be able to speak to Hizbullah from a position of
strength, and Lebanese public opinion will support him.
Olmert apparently wants to hold the cards for diplomatic negotiations.
Chief of Staff Dan Halutz promised the politicians outlining the strategy
that it would bring about the desired results. But it will take several
weeks, perhaps a month, during which Israeli civilians will suffer many more
rocket attacks, and maybe even a last-minute strike at the Tel Aviv region
out of frustration. Therefore, military pressure must continue until there
is an appropriate diplomatic solution.
And what about the kidnapped soldiers? The government and the army are
united in their opinion that the soldiers must be released as part of an
overall agreement to end the fighting in Lebanon. Separate negotiations with
Hizbullah via a third party could put domestic pressure on the Israeli
government to compromise in such a way that would grant Hizbullah an
achievement that would obscure its overall loss.
This, then, is the plan. At the moment, it must be checked out if and how it
can be brought to fruition. There is only one thing worse than failing:
Trying to solve by force that which can't be solved by force, and getting
bogged down once again in the Lebanese mud.